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Using  cross-sectional  data  for  76  countries,  we  apply  instrumental  variable  techniques  based  on 
pronoun drop, temperature and monarchies to demonstrate that historical trust levels predict several 
indicators of current welfare state design, including universalism and high levels of regulatory freedom. 
We argue that high levels of trust and trustworthiness are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
societies to develop successful universal welfare states that would otherwise be highly vulnerable to free 
riding  and  fraudulent  behavior.  Our  results  do  not  exclude  positive  feedback  from  welfare  state 
universalism to individual trust, although we claim that the important causal link runs from historically 
trust levels to current welfare state design. 
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Recently, a number of studies have claimed that the welfare state produces trust (Rothstein, 2003; 
Uslaner and Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005). In this paper, we argue that the theoretical 
mechanisms underpinning the link from welfare state design to trust are ambiguous, and that it is more 
likely  that  trust  levels  in  society explain welfare state  design  rather  than the  other way  round. To 
support our claim, we use instrumental variables (IV) to demonstrate that variations in historical levels 
of trust predict cross-country differences in current welfare state design. 
The alleged link from welfare state universality to individual trust, as explained, for example, by 
Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) rests on several claims: 
1.  The  claim  that  people  infer  others’  trustworthiness  from  how  they  perceive  public  service 
bureaucrats, 
2.  the claim that needs-tested public services give rise to suspicions concerning poor procedural 
justice due to discretionary bureaucratic power, and 
3.  the claim that universal welfare programs “give rise to a sense of equal treatment and that the 
“rules of the game” in society are based on principles of fairness.”
1 
All these claims can be discussed. If  the first claim is true, the generally improving level of 
bureaucratic quality in most countries should give rise to increasing trust. In fact, however, trust levels 
have remained stable, apparently insensitive to changes in institutional quality, as demonstrated, for 
example, by Bjørnskov (2007). Regarding the difference between universal and needs-tested welfare 
programs as described in claims two and three, it should be noted that some needs-tested programs are 
in fact easy to formalize into transparent procedures (e.g., “if individual income falls below amount X, 
                                                                        
1 All three points are from Kumlin and Rothstein (2005, p. 349).  
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the individual is entitled to income supplement according to formula Y”), whereas some “universal” 
programs require several complex discretionary judgments (e.g., public health care). 
Most importantly, the main thrust of the argument can be turned on its head. Universal access to 
public  goods,  transfers  and  services,  with  little  needs  testing  involved,  can  be  viewed  as  a  strong 
temptation to engage in free riding. If other people are repeatedly tempted to obtain benefits for which 
they have no objective need or are ineligible, should one trust them? We argue instead that trust is high 
in universal welfare states, not because welfare state universality creates trust, but because trusting 
populations are more likely to create and sustain universal welfare states. To support our claim, we 
present empirical evidence that historical trust levels explain current welfare state design, measured in 
several  ways.  We  do  this  by  examining  76  democratic  and  semi-democratic  countries,  using 
instrumental variables  based  on  linguistics  and climate  to  ensure  that we are  using  the  historically 
contingent variation in trust levels to explain welfare state universality. 
We find that high-trust countries are clearly able to finance larger total government expenditures 
and raise larger revenues, are characterized by substantially more regulatory freedom and can sustain 
higher transfers. We conclude the paper by discussing the implications of our findings and how they 
might solve extant puzzles in the literature. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we outline our theoretical considerations. 
Section 3 describes our data and the estimation strategy used in section 4, which presents the results. 
Section 5 discusses the results and presents our conclusions. 
2. Theoretical considerations 
2.1 How to identify causality? 
Much recent research suggests that social trust strongly affects economic and political behavior (see, 
e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Knack, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004). As mentioned, 
many studies note the apparent association between the very high trust levels in the Nordic countries  
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and their extended welfare state policies (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; 
Bjørnskov, in press). There are three possible ways to interpret the causality of the correlation between 
welfare state universality and trust, namely, as running 
1)  from welfare state design to trust, 
2)  from trust to welfare state design, or 
3)  from some omitted variable(s) to both trust and welfare state design. 
Discussing these three possibilities, Rothstein (2008) claims that the link from trust to welfare 
state design is difficult to evaluate due to lack of data on historical trust levels, i.e., trust before the 
universal welfare state existed. However, there are in fact several ways to handle this lack of data. 
First, as far as studies of US immigrants can inform us about historical trust levels, the Nordic 
countries seem to have been characterized by high trust long before the implementation of extensive 
welfare state policies in the 1960s (Tabellini, 2008; Uslaner, 2008). A long tradition in psychology 
indicates that a basic sense of trust of strangers is instilled in people in early childhood and remains 
relatively stable for the rest of their lives, absent major negative events (e.g., Katz and Rotter, 1969; 
Dohmen et al., 2008). As children tend to copy the social trust of their parents, aggregate trust levels 
are thus likely to remain fairly stable across time. Reflecting this process, rather than being influenced 
by the needs-tested US welfare state, people in the United States of Swedish, Norwegian, Danish or 
Finnish heritage are today approximately 10% more likely to believe that “most people can be trusted” 
than the average American (Uslaner, 2008). 
Uslaner (2008), who also documents that descendants of immigrants from low-trust countries are 
likely to be substantially less trusting than the average American, furthermore demonstrates that it does 
not seem to matter for trust levels how recently immigrants came to the United States. Albeit merely 
suggestive,  the  above  findings  clearly  indicate  that  Scandinavians  were  highly  trusting  before  the 
introduction of universal welfare policies.   
5 
 
Statistically, IV techniques can be used to separate historic trust levels (definitely not caused by 
welfare state design) from recent variation in trust (possibly endogenous to various factors, including 
welfare state design). To apply this approach validly in our case, we must use factors with very deep 
historical roots as instruments to sort out the causality. Our choice of instrumental variables is mainly 
informed by two previous studies, those of Uslaner (2008) and Tabellini (2008).  
The first variable is the “pronoun-drop characteristic” (Chomsky 1981; Kashima and Kashima 
1998) of a country’s dominant language, i.e., that the language allows the personal pronoun to be 
dropped. While neither English nor the Nordic languages allow this, several major languages, such as 
Spanish and most African languages, do. Tabellini (2008), who introduced this variable to the trust 
literature, argues that languages that allow the personal pronoun to be dropped tend to reflect cultures 
in which respect for individual rights is relatively weak. This means that the grammatical rule that 
forbids  pronoun  dropping  is  positively  linked  to  trust  –  but  not  correlated  with  welfare  state 
universality.  In  fact,  a  focus  on  individual  rather  than  group  rights  and  identities  would  seem 
inconsistent  with  universality,  which  stresses  broad  group  access  to  welfare  services  instead  of 
individual treatment. We also note that welfare regimes vary considerably within the group of countries 
with languages not allowing pronoun dropping. 
As a second instrument, we use the average temperature in the coldest month of the year. The 
idea behind this instrument is traceable to Aristotle: In countries with relatively cold winters, people 
were historically more dependent on strangers for survival. Needy strangers in such countries would 
receive help while, due to scarcity, strangers and friends alike would not receive help if not objectively 
in need. As such, the colder the winters are, the more likely it is that trust in strangers constitutes an 
evolutionarily dominant strategy. The alternative would seem to be groups characterized by Banfield’s 
(1958) “amoral familism” that would tend to be too small to be biologically sustainable in difficult 
climates. Again, if anything, this instrument would be negatively associated with the propensity to 
implement a universal welfare regime but positively correlated with trust in strangers.  
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We supplement these instruments with a dummy for the existence of monarchical institutions, 
i.e., countries being “ruled” by a king, emperor or other sovereign. We should note that in our sample, 
monarchs  presumably  have  no  direct  power,  as  all  countries  are  democratic  or  semi-democratic. 
Bjørnskov  (2007)  nevertheless  demonstrates  that  populations  in  monarchies  are  substantially  more 
trusting than otherwise. Again, there is little reason to believe that monarchies are better at sustaining 
welfare states than regimes with other kinds of titular heads of state. 
However, as recently emphasized by Rodrik (2007), an instrument does not a theory make. We 
do not claim that pronoun dropping, average temperature or monarchical institutions are important or 
useful explanations of welfare state design. Indeed, proper identification of the effects of social trust 
depends on their not providing useful explanations. We use these variables to infer historical trust levels 
to demonstrate that these can be used to predict current welfare state design, to which we now turn. 
2.2 What exactly is welfare state universality? 
The strand of social science research called “the welfare modelling business” by Abrahamson (1999) 
can be traced back at least to Titmuss (1974), who distinguishes between three ideal types of welfare 
state:  the  “marginal”  (typical  of  Anglo-Saxon  countries),  the  “industrial  achievement”  (typical  of 
Central European countries) and the “institutional” (typical of the UK and Scandinavia). For a long 
time, the standard reference was Esping-Andersen (1990), who identiﬁed three models, similar to those 
identiﬁed by Titmuss: the “liberal” (in the European sense of the word), the “corporatist” and the 
“social democratic.” However, replicating and correcting errors in the Esping-Andersen classification, 
Scruggs and Allan (2006, 2008) found very limited empirical support for the “three worlds” typology. 
Adding  to  the  confusion,  Bergh  (2004)  surveyed  the  literature,  finding  a  plethora  of  labels: 
“universal,”  “social  democratic,”  “institutional,”  “comprehensive,”  “encompassing”  and 
“Scandinavian” were all used to describe roughly the same construction – states where the government  
7 
 
not only provides legal protection, defense, basic schooling and health care to its citizens, but also 
functions as the main institution providing risk insurance and life-cycle redistribution for all citizens. 
For this reason, standard measures of the welfare state, such as public final expenditures on 
consumption or the OECD’s social expenditures database, would be improper measures of universality; 
for example, the Nordic welfare states are actually not very different when we look only at public 
expenditures on health care or schooling, for example. As our proxy for welfare state universality, we 
instead use total public revenues as a share of GDP (and total public expenditures as a robustness test). 
Total expenditures include final consumption expenditures as well as transfers, benefits and other 
“pure” welfare state costs. This measure has been criticized for exaggerating the size of the Nordic 
welfare states. For example, child grants are typically given as benefits rather than tax deductions, thus 
inflating total taxes and total revenues. In the context relevant here, this is nevertheless exactly what we 
wish to capture: the tendency of universal welfare states to rely relatively more on the state, whereas 
other countries use the market or the family as agents of welfare provision.
2 Such types of welfare 
provision are factors that necessitate a larger state and thus a substantially larger need to finance it. We 
do, however, check our results by controlling for consumption expenditures and defense spending, in 
which case differences between countries are mainly driven by differences in the size of transfers. This 
reflects the varying degrees to which countries rely on the state (rather than the market or the family) to 
handle life-cycle redistribution and risk insurance, which is typically the case in universal welfare states 
that are said to create trust. 
2.3 Welfare state universality and trust: An alternative hypothesis 
As  an  alternative  to  the  idea  that  welfare  state  universality  creates  trust,  we  suggest  that  trust  is 
necessary for the creation of universal welfare states. In a survey of the trust literature, Nannestad 
(2008) notes that  
                                                                        
2 An alternative motivation for our measure would be that the literature on universality agrees on few things except that 
universal welfare states have higher taxes and higher public expenditures, so these are what we measure.  
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… because the universal welfare states are also high-trust countries, it is tempting to hypothesize 
that it is their high level of generalized trust that has enabled them to solve the collective action 
dilemma created by their welfare systems … Thus, generalized trust is what makes the universal 
welfare system sustainable and allows equality to coexist with wealth. This line of  reasoning 
would  at  the  same  time  explain  why  countries  with  lower  levels  of  generalized  trust  have 
developed different welfare systems that give rise to fewer and smaller collective action dilemmas. 
(p. 430) 
Extending the size of the state beyond that of a minimal or “watchman” state thus entails a 
number of collective action dilemmas. Nannestad’s argument is consistent with arguments in Svendsen 
and Svendsen (2009), and also with the theoretical models of Lindbeck (1995) and Lindbeck et al. 
(1999), according to which a social norm of public permissiveness prevents a small number of citizens 
from exploiting the welfare state, which would result in exploding public expenditures. In the former, 
the main argument is that most people adhere to common, stable norms of working hard and not 
taking advantage of services for which they have no need or are ineligible because other people adhere 
to  the  same  norms.  Furthermore,  informal  institutions  such  as  trust  have  gradually  become 
“incapsulated  and  codified  into  formal  institutions  in  the  course  of  history,”  such  as  regulations 
protecting a capitalist welfare state (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009, pp. 3; Bergh, 2006). In the Lindbeck 
papers, the argument rests on the assumption that the norms and work ethics necessary to finance the 
welfare state are stronger in countries that managed to implement such systems, but prone to erosion 
over time. 
In other words, the causal mechanism may well be that high trust levels increase the feasibility of 
generous welfare states. We stress three potential mechanisms: 
1.  Without trust – and trustworthiness – universal welfare states would run into problems caused 
by free riding and may end up in financial distress due to increasing welfare costs. Since many 
public goods and services are available to everyone in society, costs are sensitive to groups  
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taking advantage of those goods and services although they are either not de facto eligible for 
them or not in need. To the extent that social trust – in this context, that people trust fellow 
citizens not to take advantage of the system – makes people less likely to exploit the system 
improperly, trust protects a universal welfare state from exploding costs. 
2.  The pressure on public bureaucracies administering universal welfare policies is strong and the 
repercussions for bureaucrats not following the rules are potentially high. As such, the existence 
of such policies puts additional pressure on the bureaucracy and makes the trustworthiness of 
bureaucrats central to the feasibility of administering such policies (cf. Bjørnskov, in press). 
This point also includes the perceived need to regulate, as Aghion et al. (2009) argue that low 
trust leads voters to demand more detailed regulation, since they do not trust bureaucrats with 
discretionary power. 
3.  Finally, universal welfare states require high taxes, which make them potentially vulnerable to 
eroding  tax  morals  and  extensive  underground  economies.  In  high-trust  societies,  these 
problems  are  less  severe,  as  trusting  populations  are  less  likely  to  cheat  on  taxes  or  seek 
transfers to which they are not entitled. In addition, bureaucracies are generally less corrupt and 
more efficient in high-trust societies.  
Thus, trust enables more extensive welfare state policies by limiting their costs, as indicated by 
Figure 1a, where the curve depicts the maximum level of government activity that is fiscally sustainable 
at  a  given  trust  level,  all  else  being  equal.  As  such,  the  figure  reflects  our  simple  theoretical 
considerations, as it depicts the level of government expenditures that are possible, but not necessarily 
the level actually chosen. The realized level is governed by two processes. We think of these processes 
as equivalent to decisions subject to a participation constraint, which is  primarily political, and an 
incentive constraint, which outlines the financial feasibility of a given political choice. In other words, 
the line in Figure 1a illustrates the incentive constraint while the participation constraint affects how  
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closely countries are situated to the line. This implies two processes related to each constraint: 1) 
financial sustainability and 2) the political choice of whether or not to use the financial leeway.  
The main function of social trust in the above framework is in moving the incentive constraint, 
the curved line along which a welfare state can be financed. At a given trust level, we also expect 
countries with smaller government to regulate more, and vice versa. Figure 1b summarizes the links 
between trust and welfare state design identified in related literature and those explored in the present 
paper. 
 
Insert Figure 1a and 1b here 
 
In  the  next  section,  we  test  our  hypothesis  using  a  cross-section  of  democratic  and  semi-
democratic countries for which we have reliable trust data. 
3. Data 
In the following, we employ data from a wide range of sources. First, our trust measure has become 
standard over the last decade. It is the percent of a population that answers yes to the question “In 
general, do you think most people can be trusted or can’t you be too careful?” While this question may 
seem vague and imprecise, it performs surprisingly well in test-retest situations and correlates strongly 
with, for example, return rates in wallet-drop experiments (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1997). Nannestad 
(2008, p. 419) also notes that “respondents do not in general seem to find the generalized trust question 
difficult,” as only very small shares of respondents do not respond to the question. While Glaeser et al. 
(2000) question the degree to which answers to the trust question reflect actual behaviors, recent 
experimental evidence suggests that this trust measure is a clear determinant of actual trusting behavior, 
although perhaps only in situations in which the stakes are of economic significance (Sapienza et al., 
2007; Cox et al., 2009).  
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The trust levels within our sample are distributed broadly, ranging from 3.4% (Cape Verde) to 
64.3%  (Sweden),  with  a  mean  score  of  26.2%.  These  scores  have  been  demonstrated  to  remain 
remarkably stable for most countries, although a few have experienced clear trends in recent decades.
3 
Evidence presented by Uslaner (2008) and Tabellini (2008) suggests that there is at least a culturally 
stable core of social trust in most countries. Nevertheless, to use the variations in trust levels that 
precede the rise of modern welfare states, we opt for an IV approach, described in more detail below. 
To describe current welfare state institutions, we use the cost of welfare state policies as well as 
the extent of labor market regulations and other policies supporting such institutions. Our preferred 
measures  of  welfare  state  policies  are  the  total  2008  government  expenditures  and  government 
revenues in percent of GDP (both taken from CIA, 2008). These data capture the size of the public 
sector, including all transfers and benefits payments and the need to finance them.  
According to our theory, historical trust levels let countries develop more universalistic welfare 
policies, but trust and trustworthiness also partially substitute for controls and regulations, following 
the Aghion et al. (2009) argument. To test this part of our hypothesis, we use a set of established 
indices of regulatory freedom obtained from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World: 
2008 Annual Report (Gwartney et al., 2008). 
We supplement the specification with a set of other variables. First, we add regional dummies to 
control  for  broad  regional  differences  in  culture  and  political  tradition;  we  only  report  the  post-
communist dummy. Second, we add a measure of openness (trade volume as a percent of GDP) in 
view of Rodrik’s (1998) compensation hypothesis, which suggests that more open countries have larger 
welfare states.
4 We approximate Wagner’s Law by adding GDP per capita; both this and the openness 
                                                                        
3 The examples of obviously non-stationary trust scores since the early 1980s include the much-discussed declines in the 
USA and the UK, but also positive trends in Denmark and Uruguay. 
4 The idea that open economies develop larger welfare states in response to the volatility caused by economic openness 
(known as the compensation hypothesis) can in fact be traced back to Lindbeck (1975). Recently, however, Kim (2007) and  
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measure are from Heston et al. (2006). Finally, to proxy for the political environment, we use the ten-
year averages of government ideology, taken from the Database of Political Institutions and following 
the approach of Bjørnskov (2008). Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Our choice of instrumental variables to sort out the causality is informed by previous studies by 
Uslaner (2008) and Tabellini (2008), as outlined in section 2. We use three predetermined variables that, 
as substantiated by tests, only affect the extent of welfare state policies through social trust. The first of 
these  variables  is  the  “pronoun-drop  characteristic”  (Kashima  and  Kashima,  1998)  of  a  country’s 
dominant language, introduced into the trust literature by Tabellini (2008). As the second instrument, 
we use the average temperature in the coldest month of the year. We do so based on the simple 
argument, traceable to Aristotle, that in countries with relatively cold winters, people were historically 
more dependent on strangers for survival. As such, trust would have been positively correlated with 
colder climate long before welfare states arose. Third, we add a dummy for monarchies, as Bjørnskov 
(2007)  has  demonstrated  that  countries  that  have  preserved  monarchical  institutions,  even  in  the 
present sample of democracies, are substantially more trusting. 
 
4. Empirical results 
We first test whether there really is an association between trust and the extent of the welfare state. A 
preliminary indication can be gauged from the scatterplot in Figure 2, which presents the theoretical 
schematic  in  Figure  1a  using  actual  data.  The  potential  size  of  government  expenditures  clearly 
increases with trust, while the southeast quadrant includes both countries constrained by their level of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              




development (i.e., India, Thailand and Taiwan) and some countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition (i.e., 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA). Conversely, the Nordic welfare states are all situated in 
the northeast corner. With the perennial exception of France (and Belgium), perhaps the developed 
country with the strongest statist tradition, the northwest quadrant of the figure is empty, consistent 
with our expectation that low-trust countries cannot sustain large welfare states. 
 
4.1. Trust and overall government expenditure 
Noting that the association, as claimed in the literature, is quite real, we proceed to a set of cross-
country estimates in Table 2, using the instruments described above. Odd-numbered columns present 
the results using government total expenditures (% of GDP) as the dependent variable, while even-
numbered columns use government total revenues. Our main results are presented in columns 1 and 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The cross-sectional evidence in the table indicates that the simple pattern in Figure 2 is replicated 
in  the  table.  The  table  also  shows  that  our  simple  specification  explains  a  reasonable  part  of  the 
variation,  and  that  the  instruments  are  sufficiently  strong  and  valid,  judging  from  the  first-stage 
statistics  and  Hansen’s  J  statistic.  Among  the  determinants  of  government  expenditures  and 
government revenues in 2008, we find the strongest association with social trust, along with openness, 
which is consistently significant for expenditures but not revenues. However, neither ideological nor 
common-law countries (basically the United Kingdom and its offspring) are significant, and the post-
communist dummy is not robustly associated with welfare state size. 
To  verify  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  exclude  11  obvious  outliers  (defined  by  their 
residuals), in which case we find slightly smaller coefficients for trust as well as clear indications of  
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Wagner’s Law, as GDP becomes strongly significant when outliers are removed.
5 In columns 5 and 6, 
we  add  to  our  regressions  the  share  of  GDP  spent  on  the  military  and  other  government  final 
consumption, which effectively leaves us with the variation in government expenditures and revenues 
directly attributable to welfare state activities, such as transfers, subsidies and non-minimal government 
services. In other words, the results indicate that the effect of trust is not likely to work through the 
scope of necessary government responsibilities, but through the parts of government activity related to 
welfare state design. We furthermore note that a Kleibergen-Paap rank LM test of weak identification 
indicates only a 10% maximal IV relative bias. 
Our results are not only statistically but also economically significant: the estimates suggest that a 
one-standard-deviation  increase  in  trust  leads  to  a  sizable  equilibrium  increase  in  government 
expenditures and revenues of approximately 40–55% of a standard deviation.  
 
4.2. Trust and government regulation 
We thus find that social trust is clearly associated with the size and scope of welfare state spending. A 
related issue is whether high-trust countries regulate less tightly for various reasons. In fact, high-tax 
Nordic  welfare  states  have  typically  made  their  economies  more  competitive  by  strategically 
deregulating parts of the public sector, as demonstrated by Bergh (2006). This finding is very much in 
line with the positive links between trust and equilibrium regulatory freedom (Aghion et al., 2009), 
between trust and deregulation of business (Heinemann and Tanz, 2008) and between trust and policy 
innovation (Knack, 2002). Thus, tight regulation of parts of the economy could in principle substitute 
for government financing of activities. We therefore need to ascertain that high-trust countries do not 
simply regulate instead of finance activities directly. We test this possibility in Table 3. 
                                                                        
5 Several countries are consistent outliers in our analyses: those with governments smaller than expected include Finland, 
Poland, Taiwan, Thailand and the USA, while those with governments larger than expected include Bolivia, Hungary, Italy, 




Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Using the Fraser Institute index of regulation, we essentially retest the findings of Algan and 
Cahuc (2006) and Aghion et al. (2009) in a larger sample of countries. The results, presented in Table 3, 
confirm that trust is associated with regulatory freedom. This result is robust to excluding outliers, but 
appears to be driven by the business and credit areas, not by labor market regulations (contrary to 
Algan and Cahuc, 2006). We also find that richer countries have less rigid regulations, that common-law 
countries have fewer business and labor market regulations, whereas post-communist countries have 
clearly deregulated their labor and credit markets and openness there is associated with the level of 
credit market freedom. 
Finally, in Table 4 we test whether regulatory freedom is associated with larger or smaller welfare 
states.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
The results indicate that regulatory freedom in the business area is significantly associated with 
government expenditures and revenues, although only at the 10% level, while the other areas are not.
6 
We also find that when including business regulations, the coefficient of social trust increases markedly. 
While we do not want to stress this result too much, it is indicative of an indirect effect exerted through 
regulation. 
Taking the extent of our findings at face value indicates that a one-standard-deviation shock (14 
percentage points) to social trust leads to an increase in freedom from business regulations of almost 
one  point  on  a  ten-point  scale.  In  total,  a  one-standard-deviation  shock  to  trust  thus  leads  to  an 
                                                                        
6
 Robustness tests (not shown) of the results indicate that the weakly significant results become strongly significant 
when excluding the group of outlier countries.  
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increase in total government expenditures of approximately five percentage points (45% of a standard 
deviation)  and  an  increase  in  government  revenues  of  6.5  percentage  points  (60%  of  a  standard 
deviation).  This  effect  can  be  decomposed  into  direct  effects  of  7  and  8.5  percentage  points  on 
expenditures  and  revenues,  respectively,  and  indirect  effects  through  business  regulations  of 
approximately  –2  percentage  points. As  these effects  are  sizable  and  not due  to  government  final 
consumption  expenditures,  but  most  likely  operate  exclusively  through  welfare  state-related 
government activities (cf. Table 2), we proceed to discussing their relevance. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
A growing literature connects the extent of the welfare state with levels of social trust. For obvious 
reasons, this literature has taken the Scandinavian welfare states as its starting point due to their record 
levels of trust as well as the size, scope and universality of their welfare regimes. Important in this 
literature is Rothstein’s claim that welfare state institutions and universality actively create social trust. 
This,  Rothstein  argues,  happens  through  three  channels:  1)  peoples’  inference  of  others’ 
trustworthiness  through  how  they  perceive  public  service  bureaucrats;  2)  belief  that  needs  testing 
somehow  gives  rise  to  suspicions  concerning  poor  procedural  justice;  and  3)  belief  that  universal 
welfare programs create a general feeling of equal treatment and fairness. 
In this paper, we have argued for the reverse causality, trying to refute Rothstein’s arguments. We 
note that the Scandinavian welfare states were unlikely to function from the outset without very high 
and preexisting levels of social trust. First, we note that evidence from studies of US immigrants suggests 
that  the  Scandinavian  countries  were  characterized  by  high  levels  of  social  trust  well  before  the 
introduction of welfare state universality. Second, we argue that trust sustains the universal welfare state 
through three main mechanisms: 1) by limiting problems caused by free riding and thus protecting the 
state from increasing welfare costs; 2) by affecting the trustworthiness of both the bureaucrats central 
to the feasibility of administering such policies as well as the regulatory framework, effectively allowing  
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fewer  and  less-detailed  regulations;  and  3)  by  limiting  financing  problems  associated  with  citizens 
operating in the underground economy, cheating on taxes and seeking transfers to which they are not 
entitled. 
Our  relatively  simple  evidence  in  section  4  strongly  indicates  that  social  trust  facilitates  the 
sustainable  existence  of  a  universal  welfare  state.  We  find  that  what  we  consider  the  long-run 
equilibrium level of government expenditures is strongly affected by trust. Through two channels, an 
apparently direct effect not captured by an array of institutional data and an indirect effect operating 
through more regulatory freedom, countries with one-standard-deviation-higher social trust have on 
average  higher  government  expenditures,  i.e.,  6%  of  GDP.  The  direct  effect  of  trust  amounts  to 
approximately 8% of GDP, while an indirect effect, operating through less detailed regulations, reduces 
the full effect by approximately 2% of GDP. We note that this precisely corresponds to the difference 
between  the  size  of  the  public  sector  in  an  average  democratic  country  and  in  the  Scandinavian 
universal welfare states. In other words, our findings have the desirable effect of making the Nordic 
countries essentially “ordinary” cases of institutional choice instead of outliers, that is, socialist welfare 
regimes combined with capitalist economic systems in an apparently ideologically incoherent mix.  
As  a  corollary, we  might  add  that  Scandinavia  has  historically  seemed  an outlier  in Western 
civilization. Lookofsky (2008), for example, notes that the centuries-old Scandinavian legal tradition of 
accepting oral agreements as legally binding can be seen as reflecting a similar normative tradition of 
impersonal honesty. Likewise, even though Denmark and Sweden both became absolutist regimes in 
the  seventeenth  century,  historians  often  note  that  Scandinavian  absolutism  was  particularly  weak 
compared with such regimes in the rest of Europe. Reflecting Putnam’s (1993) original idea, it would be 
productive to explore the special cultural and historical traits of Scandinavia that seem to have affected 
economic, social and political behavior and continues to set these countries on a somewhat different 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Observations  Nordic mean 
Log GDP per capita  9.030  1.025  79  10.193 
Postcommunist  .203  .404  79  0 
Openness  75.709  37.446  79  69.551 
Common law  26.621  14.065  79  0 
Political ideology  .098  .561  79  –.102 
Regulatory freedom  6.844  .887  78  7.882 
Business regulations  6.199  1.234  78  8.226 
Labor regulations  5.695  1.297  78  5.976 
Credit regulations  8.637  .877  78  9.448 
Government spending  31.821  11.347  77  45.432 
Government revenues  32.314  10.729  76  40.056 
Legal quality  6.429  1.943  78  9.186 
Social trust  26.621  14.065  79  58.434 
 





Table 2. Trust and welfare state institutions 
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Observations  77  76  65  65  72  72 
Adjusted R 
squared 
.354  .329  .720  .706  .389  .463 
F statistic  8.97  7.41  26.09  19.37  7.91  10.00 
First stage F  9.53  9.44  8.28  7.61  7.35  7.35 
First stage R 
squared 
.317  .316  .323  .358  .289  .289 
Hansen J 
statistic, p < 
.755  .856  .469  .947  .916  .747 
Note: *** (**) [*] denote significance at p < .01 (p < .05) [p < .10]. All regressions include dummies for Asia, Latin America, 
North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Instruments are dummies for pronoun-drop languages and 




Table 3. Trust and welfare state institutions 
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Observations  76  65  76  76  76   
Adjusted R 
squared 
.457  .604  .499  .328  .311   
F statistic  9.80  11.98  14.49  6.42  3.22   
First stage F  8.73  6.67  8.73  8.73  8.73   
First stage R 
squared 
.311  .312  .311  .311  .311   
Hansen J 
statistic, p < 
.817  .817  .048  .475  .990   
Note: *** (**) [*] denote significance at p < .01 (p < .05) [p < .10]. All regressions include dummies for Asia, Latin America, 
North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Instruments are dummies for pronoun-drop languages and 






Table 4. Trust and the size of the welfare state, additional channels 
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Observations  75  76  75  76  75  76 
Adjusted R 
squared 
.274  .274  .321  .327  .303  .309 
F statistic  6.55  7.73  6.46  7.50  6.05  7.19 
First stage F  6.08  6.27  7.61  7.72  7.42  7.44 
First stage R 
squared 
.231  .235  .290  .292  .266  .266 
Hansen J statistic, 
p < 
.822  .542  .809  .779  .823  .751 
Note: *** (**) [*] denote significance at p < .01 (p< .05) [p < .10]. All regressions include dummies for Asia, Latin America, 
North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Instruments are dummies for pronoun-drop languages and 
monarchies, and the average temperature in the coldest month of the year.   
26 
 
Table A1. Social trust and instrumental variables 
Country  1  2  3  Country  1  2  3 
Argentina  19.4  No  10.0  Luxembourg  30.5  No  0.2 
Australia  47.1  Yes  5.3  Macedonia  10.9  No  0.2 
Austria  37.6  Yes  –0.8  Madagascar  32.8  No  14.5 
Bangladesh  22.2  Yes  18.3  Malawi  5.5  No  15.2 
Belgium  31.4  No  2.0  Mali  27.5  No  24.9 
Benin  27.4  No  25.2  Malta  24.6  No  13.0 
Bolivia  19.3  No  6.9  Mexico  24.2  No  12.9 
Botswana  11.7  No  12.9  Moldova  18.2  Yes  –5.0 
Bulgaria  29.0  No  –1.1  Mongolia  12.6  No  –16.0 
Canada  49.0  Yes  –7.1  Mozambique  25.2  No  13.0 
Cape Verde  3.4  No  19.0  Namibia  20.5  No  13.2 
Chile  17.2  No  8.4  Netherlands  53.6  Yes  2.5 
Colombia  16.3  No  12.7  New Zealand  51.2  Yes  8.5 
Costa Rica  13.5  No  19.1  Nicaragua  18.7  No  26.3 
Croatia  21.0  No  0.0  Norway  63.9  Yes  –4.0 
Cyprus  18.7  No  11.4  Panama  22.3  No  27.0 
Czech Republic  26.2  Yes  –1.3  Paraguay  9.5  No  18.0 
Denmark  60.7  Yes  –0.4  Peru  9.9  No  14.8 
Dominican Republic  26.4  No  24.2  Philippines  7.6  No  25.9 
Ecuador  16.1  No  13.1  Poland  20.0  No  –3.7 
El Salvador  16.4  No  22.2  Portugal  20.0  No  10.5 
Estonia  28.2  Yes  –4.0  Romania  16.6  No  –2.9 
Finland  58.0  Yes  –6.5  Senegal  26.8  No  17.0 
France  22.3  Yes  3.5  Slovakia  21.2  Yes  –1.3 
Georgia  18.7  No  0.9  Slovenia  19.6  No  –1.1 
Germany  37.7  Yes  –0.9  South Africa  19.6  No  10.9 
Ghana  15.5  Yes  24.1  South Korea  33.2  No  –3.5 
Greece  21.6  No  9.1  Spain  32.8  No  5.3 
Guatemala  21.5  No  16.5  Sweden  64.3  Yes  –3.5 
Honduras  18.8  No  19.3  Switzerland  44.3  Yes  –1.1 
Hungary  26.3  Yes  0.2  Taiwan  38.2  No  15.2 
Iceland  45.3  No  –0.3  Thailand  54.2  No  25.5 
India  33.9  No  14.1  Trinidad and Tobago  3.8  Yes  24.0 
Ireland  39.1  Yes  4.8  Ukraine  27.8  No  –5.9 
Israel  23.5  No  12.3  United Kingdom  36.4  Yes  3.9 
Italy  29.7  No  6.8  Uruguay  27.3  No  10.5 
Japan  39.7  Yes  6.9  USA  41.5  Yes  –1.0 
Latvia  18.5  Yes  –4.9  Venezuela  14.1  No  24.5 
Lesotho  15.7  No  9.0         
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